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Thijs Van de Graaf , Tim Haesebrouck and Peter Debaere
Department of Political Science, Ghent University, Gent, Belgium
ABSTRACT
European countries have developed strikingly different responses to shale gas
and fracking. Some have imposed outright bans, while others have issued
permits and even awarded generous tax breaks to the industry. To explain
this puzzling variance, this article builds a theoretical framework that focuses
on energy security, economic competitiveness, the party composition of
government, public opinion, multilevel governance and democratic tradition.
It then conducts a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) of the regulation of
shale gas in 16 European Union member countries. We find that the level of
public concern is a sufficient condition for restrictive regulation. Other
conditions only work in combination with others, while energy security and
democratic tradition have no impact on the regulation of shale gas and
fracking. The findings indicate that the uptake of shale gas is not simply a
function of structural factors such as geology or population density, but rather
the result of political factors.
KEYWORDS Comparative public policy; hydraulic fracturing (‘fracking’); (risk) regulation; shale gas;
qualitative comparative analysis (QCA).
1. Introduction
Thanks to technological breakthroughs such as horizontal drilling and hydrau-
lic fracturing (or ‘fracking’), shale gas production has soared dramatically in
the United States (US) since 2007. The US shale gas revolution has lowered
the country’s domestic gas prices, CO2 emissions and energy import depen-
dency, but it has also raised concern over the related environmental, safety
and health risks. While the US, Canada and China are so far the only countries
where shale gas is produced in commercial quantities, shale formations rich in
gas can be found all over the world. Estimates of shale gas resources in Europe
are comparable in magnitude to those for the US (EIA 2013). This begs the
question of whether and to what extent Europe will replicate the US shale
gas revolution.
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European countries have developed strikingly different responses to this
question. Some, such as France and Bulgaria, have completely banned shale
gas exploitation. Others, such as Poland and the United Kingdom (UK), have
issued permits and even awarded generous tax breaks to support shale gas
extraction. Moreover, many countries have experienced remarkable policy
swings over time. Romania, for example, granted a permit to Chevron in
March 2012, then enacted a moratorium in May, only to lift it seven months
later. At present, 18 European Union (EU) member states are estimated to
have recoverable shale gas reserves and eight countries have banned fracking
(cf. infra).
At the outset, it is worth mentioning that there is no specific EU regulation
on shale gas, only a set of non-binding recommendations (European Commis-
sion 2014). Of course, some of the environmental, health and safety issues
associated with shale gas and fracking are addressed by existing EU rules.
Yet, the EU essentially leaves national governments in charge of deciding
on whether or not to allow shale gas extraction. Our goal is not to explain
the absence of a common EU policy on shale gas which, in itself, is not surpris-
ing, given that the Lisbon Treaty (Art. 176 A) explicitly designates energy
exploitation and the energy mix as the exclusive sovereign prerogative of
the member states.
Instead, we address a different question: why have some EU member
countries prohibited fracking for shale gas while others have embraced the
new technology? This question matters empirically, since the regulation of
shale gas in EU member countries has an effect on environmental protection,
economic competitiveness, energy security and human health in the EU. It is
also theoretically relevant, as the variance in European regulations of shale gas
presents a puzzle to scholars of comparative politics and risk regulation. Prior
studies have suggested a myriad of structural factors to explain divergence in
the embrace of fracking, including geology (e.g., the structure of shale for-
mations and water availability), geography (e.g., population density), deep
regulatory structures (e.g., subsoil mineral rights ownership), energy security
(e.g., high vulnerability to import disruptions), and market structures (e.g.,
existence of a gas service industry and infrastructure) (McGowan 2014).
While important, these structural factors alone offer an incomplete expla-
nation of variation and its causes. Countries that have similar shale endow-
ments and market structures, or are governed by similar laws (e.g.,
directives at the EU level), do not necessarily adopt similar policies towards
fracking. A case in point are Bulgaria (where fracking is banned) and Poland
(no ban) (Goldthau and LaBelle 2016). Moreover, most of these structural
factors are relatively stable over time and are outside of the reach of the con-
scious influence of present actors. As such, they cannot explain the frequent
occurrence of policy reversals with regard to fracking. An exclusive focus on
structural factors, finally, neglects the critical role of political factors and
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agency in shaping regulation of risky technologies such as shale gas (Bomberg
2017). This study argues that it is only through a combination of structural and
political factors that the varying uptake of shale gas in Europe can be fully
understood.
Such a perspective helps to plug several gaps in the literature. A recent
review of the political science literature on shale gas found that ‘investi-
gations into the regulatory governance of shale gas remain scarce’ (Gold-
thau 2016: 74). To the extent that regulation is addressed at all, it is
often done in evaluative-prescriptive rather than in explanatory ways.
Moreover, the bulk of this literature takes the form of small-n case
studies focusing on one or just a few European countries (e.g., Goldthau
and LaBelle 2016; Johnson and Boersma 2013; Metze 2017), US states
(e.g., Davis 2012), or Canadian provinces (e.g., Carter and Eaton 2016). A
notable exception is McGowan (2014), who studies the regulation of frack-
ing in a number of EU countries, but his study does not take into account
developments beyond 2012.
This article will heed the calls by McGowan (2014) and Goldthau (2016) to
examine shale gas through the lens of regulatory governance. We first
develop a theoretical framework based on general theories of regulation as
well as dedicated shale gas studies. Next, we map shale gas regulations in
16 EU member countries during the period 2010–2015, and categorize
them on a continuum ranging from ‘permissive’ to ‘restrictive’ regulations.
Through a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), we identify the combi-
nations of conditions that best explains the observed regulatory outcomes.
To preview the findings, our analysis reveals that different paths can lead
countries to embrace or oppose fracking and, in most of these paths, public
opinion is the decisive factor.
2. Theoretical framework
Why governments choose different courses of action – or decide not to act at
all – is the basic question that lies at the heart of comparative policy studies
(Engeli and Allison 2013; Gupta 2012). Comparative regulatory research has
identified a wide, yet often conflicting, range of explanatory variables for regu-
latory divergence across countries. These explanations are drawn from a
myriad of fields, including risk analysis, cultural theory, economics, sociology
and political science. They are often summarized under the rubric of ‘interests,
ideas and institutions’ (Baldwin et al. 2012).
2.1. Interests
Public interest theories centre on the idea that regulation is developed in
pursuit of interest-related objectives, as opposed to group, sector or individual
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self-interests (Baldwin et al. 2012). The most prominently cited public interest
that might be served by allowing shale gas exploitation is security of energy
supply (McGowan 2014). Having a secure supply of energy is vital for any
country’s economic growth, military power and social peace. Therefore, gov-
ernments invariably treat energy security as a strategic priority (Van de Graaf
et al. 2016). Security of supply concerns are often more elevated for natural
gas than for oil, since gas is more difficult to store and transport, and hence
more prone to geopolitical extortion. We can thus hypothesize that the
more a country relies on imported natural gas to satisfy its domestic energy
needs, and the more vulnerable these gas imports are to (political or techni-
cal) disruption, the more likely the government is to support domestic shale
gas extraction.
H1: Countries with high dependence on vulnerable gas imports are more likely
to adopt permissive shale gas regulations.
Another interest-driven explanation centres on the level of economic
development. Previous research has established that richer countries
have ‘both more reason and more means to control pollution’ (Lenschow
et al. 2005: 810), and thus have stricter environmental policies. Börzel
(2002) even identifies the level of economic development, broadly
measured by gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, as the most impor-
tant factor that explains whether a country is an environmental leader or
laggard at the European level. These findings are broadly in line with the
so-called ‘environmental Kuznets curve’, which posits that environmental
quality first declines and then improves as countries become richer
(Ekins 1997). From this perspective, we would expect poorer countries to
be relatively more concerned about economic benefits than about
environmental costs and health risks, in contrast to more economically
advanced countries.1
H2: Economically less advanced countries are more likely to adopt permissive
shale gas regulations.
2.2. Ideas
Ideational accounts can be unpacked in two major tenets. One tenet points to
changing (party) ideologies that shape approaches towards regulation. It has
been established that differences in party composition of government matter
in public policy in constitutional democracies (Schmidt 2002). While political
parties and governments have traditionally been positioned along an ideo-
logical left–right scale, it is possible to position them on a green–brown
scale. This gives an indication of whether parties and governments strongly
support environmental protection even at the cost of economic growth
(‘green’ preferences), or take the inverse position (‘brown’ preferences).
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According to this hypothesis, the more governmental parties have green pre-
ferences, the more likely they are to oppose shale gas.
H3: Countries ruled by governments with ‘brown’ ideological preferences are
more likely to adopt permissive shale gas regulations.
There is a long tradition in comparative public policy that emphasizes the
impact of public opinion (e.g., Page and Shapiro 1983). Recent research has
broadly confirmed evidence that political leaders are influenced by public
majority while making policy choices (Burstein and Linton 2002). Public
opinion will thus likely play a critical role in shaping the degree to which
unconventional gas reserves are developed in the EU, in the same way that
public acceptance and risk perception shape the potential viability of other
emerging technologies (Kasperson and Ram 2013). Public attitudes towards
shale gas can be a product of socio-demographics, perceptions of risks and
benefits, affective imagery, geographic proximity and worldviews (Boudet
et al. 2014).
H4: Countries with high levels of public concern over the risks of fracking will
more likely adopt restrictive shale gas regulations.
2.3. Institutions
Institutional accounts can take many forms, but one prominent approach
claims that institutional structures may vary across countries in the extent
to which they provide access to particular interest groups to the regulatory
process (Hall and Taylor 1996). Given that many of the benefits of shale gas
accrue to the state, while the most adverse risks tend to be local (water
use, aquifer contamination, heavy traffic, seismic shocks, etc.), we can hypoth-
esize that countries with unitary governance systems will more likely embrace
shale gas than countries with federal or multilevel governance systems. Multi-
level systems, by nature, will take local interests more into account. Bernauer
and Meins (2003) similarly claim that environmental and consumer interests
are more likely to gain ground vis-à-vis producers in multilevel regulatory
systems, which provide more access points for consumer groups compared
with centralized regulatory systems.
H5: Countries with multilevel governance systems are more likely to adopt
restrictive shale gas regulations.
Finally, we build on the hypothesis that regulation is embedded in historical
contexts and requires understanding of factors such as state traditions and
structures (Thatcher 2002). In this respect, the long-standing and persistent
East–West divide in Europe presents itself as a critical factor (Epstein and
Jacoby 2014). Evidence from prior research indeed suggests that the commu-
nist legacy still weighs heavily on environmental governance in Eastern
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European countries, where non-state actors are still much less involved in the
policy process (Börzel 2009). Therefore, we would expect the level of social,
environmental and human welfare concerns to be higher in the countries
of long-standing democratic history compared to ‘newcomers’ that have
long been ruled by authoritarian systems and have less of an embedded
history of caring for environmental degradation and social welfare.
H6: Countries with a long-standing democratic tradition are more likely to adopt
restrictive shale gas regulations.
3. Research design
3.1 Method and case selection
The remainder of our study will test how well these hypotheses explain var-
iance in the regulation of fracking in a sample of European countries. The
case selection was guided by the following criteria. First, our analysis
focuses on the member states of the EU, which can be expected to share
enough background characteristics to be considered a homogeneous popu-
lation. Second, our study only includes member states with shale deposits.
According to the authoritative study of the German Federal Institute for
Geosciences and Natural Resources (Andruleit et al. 2013), these are:
Austria; Belgium; Bulgaria; Croatia; Czech Republic; Denmark; Estonia;
France; Germany; Hungary; Ireland; Latvia; Lithuania; Luxembourg; the Neth-
erlands; Poland; Portugal; Romania; Slovakia; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; and
the UK (see also Figure A1.1 in the Online Appendix). Third, we exclude
countries that reported not to have any recoverable shale gas reserves or
only very limited or non-profitable resources: Estonia; Latvia; Slovakia; Slove-
nia; and Sweden.2 Fourth, Belgium and Croatia were excluded because com-
parable data on public opinion was not available.3 This gives us a sample of
16 cases.
This article employs the method of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA).
QCA is a case-oriented technique that allows for a systematic comparison of a
mid-sized or large number of cases on three to eight conditions. It is geared
towards establishing set-theoretic connections between one case property,
defined as the ‘outcome’, and other properties, defined as the ‘causal con-
ditions’. Such set-theoretic connections can be interpreted in terms of suffi-
cient and/or necessary causes. A key strength of QCA is that it is capable of
capturing a complex form of causality, generally described as ‘multiple con-
junctural causation’ (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 77). Multiple causation
implies that there can be multiple paths towards an outcome; conjunctural
causation implies that these paths often consist of a combination of con-
ditions. Therefore, QCA is particularly apt for our study: the number of cases
is intermediate (N = 16) and our outcome of interest (i.e., shale gas regulation)
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is expected to result from a complex interaction of structural and political
conditions.
We opt for the fuzzy set rather than the crisp set version of QCA because
the outcome and conditions represent complex phenomena, which vary
both in kind and in degree. Fuzzy membership scores vary between 1 and
0, depending on the degree to which a variable is present in a given case.
The qualitative status of a case depends on its position towards the 0.5
anchor, which indicates whether a variable is either more present or more
absent in a given case. The assignment of fuzzy membership scores, or cali-
bration, is described in the following subsections. The raw data and fuzzy
membership scores are presented in Section 3 of the Online Appendix.
3.2. Outcome
The outcome of interest is domestic regulation of shale gas exploration and
development that may require the use of high-volume hydraulic fracturing.
There is a continuum in Europe, ranging from governments that have restric-
tive regulations of shale gas to those that have permissive regulations. We
have developed a novel scale to capture this variation (see Figure 1).4
. Opposition: A first group of governments is strictly opposed to shale gas
and has put in place highly prohibitive regulations. For these governments,
the scientific evidence is conclusive and their opposition to shale gas and
fracking is principled. Examples are France and Bulgaria, which have put in
place open-ended moratoria on shale gas exploration. Both countries have
reaffirmed the permanent nature of the ban and cancelled all previously
issued exploration permits.
. Precaution: A second group of governments has temporarily banned shale
gas exploration, pending further scientific evidence on the risks and conse-
quences of its extraction. These governments often refer to the precaution-
ary principle, which is embedded in the EU’s Lisbon Treaty. These
governments emphasize the temporary character of the moratorium by
determining an end-date or suspending rather than cancelling existing
exploration projects. This is the case in the Netherlands and Germany,
where governments have halted commercial shale gas exploration by
fracking until the end of this decade. Romania and the UK have also
imposed short bans, in 2012 and 2011 respectively, but these have
already been lifted.
Figure 1. Scale of regulatory attitudes towards shale gas.
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. Tolerance: A third group allows shale gas exploration and has issued
permits, but has not adopted additional measures to encourage fracking.
Governments in this group tend to enact legislation that puts additional
burdens on the shale gas industry. Spain, for instance, has issued permits
for shale gas exploration but has at the same time adopted a new environ-
mental law in December 2013 that includes a mandatory environmental
impact assessment for all shale gas projects.
. Support: A final group has not only issued permits but also enacted legis-
lation to encourage and speed up shale gas extraction. The UK, for instance,
has proposed generous tax breaks for the industry (the tax rate on pro-
duction income for shale gas companies is only 30 per cent, compared to
the typical 62 per cent rate that applies to North Sea gas and oil production)
alongside lucrative compensation for communities hosting shale gas rigs.
To determine the outcome, shale gas regulations have been traced in each of
the 16 cases, from 2010 until 2015. The coding of the outcome variable is pri-
marily based on information retrieved from the European Commission’s ques-
tionnaires on the application of its Recommendation 2014/70/EU. The
questionnaires sought to determine whether member states grant or plan
to grant authorizations for the exploration or production of hydrocarbons
that may require the use of high-volume hydraulic fracturing. To cross-
check and complement the information from the questionnaires, we have
also consulted other open-source information including national and inter-
national media, data from international institutions such as the EU and the
International Energy Agency (IEA), energy companies and consultancy firms,
academic publications, as well as communications by national governments.
The obtained data have been triangulated to rule out missing or contradictory
information. The results of our coding analysis are depicted in Table 1. A more
detailed summary can be found in Section 2 of the Online Appendix.
Table 1 leads to three conclusions. First, it demonstrates the striking var-
iance in shale gas regulation in our sample of countries. While all countries
in our sample had a tolerant attitude towards shale gas in 2010, their paths
consequently diverged. Second, the table also reveals that some countries
have undergone significant policy swings over time. The UK, for instance,
switched from tolerance to precaution and then to support. Romania
moved from tolerance to precaution and back to tolerance. Third, the table
shows that country positions have remained surprisingly stable since 2013.
No country has changed its position since then. Eight countries have
adopted a rather permissive policy (Austria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Portu-
gal, Romania, Spain and the UK) and eight have adopted a rather restrictive
policy (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxem-
bourg and the Netherlands). Our analysis is geared toward explaining these
relatively stable positions, rather than fluctuations over time or the exact
timing of policy changes.
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The calibration of the outcome is based on the cases’ positions on the
restrictive–permissive continuum. In order to qualify for membership in the
set permissive regulation (receive a score above 0.5), a state has to allow
shale gas exploration. States that tolerate shale gas exploration are assigned
a score of 0.75, while states that actively support exploration are assigned a
score of 1. At the low end of the scale, cases that temporarily ban fracking
receive score of 0.25, cases with an open-ended moratorium a score of 0.
3.3. Conditions
The calibration of the conditions is based on the method of transformational
assignment, which uses a continuous function to fit base variable values (or
raw data) between three qualitative anchors at 1 (full set-membership), 0.5
(point of maximally ambiguous set membership), and 0 (full non-member-
ship) (Thiem and Duşa 2013: 55).5 The following paragraphs concisely describe
the operationalization of the base variables and the choice of the qualitative
breakpoints, a more detailed description is provided in Section 3 of the Online
Appendix.
Table 1. Regulation of shale gas in selected EU countries, 2010–2015.
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First, the base variable for Energy Security (ES), share of domestic gas con-
sumption supplied by unreliable suppliers gcii, is calculated as given in the fol-
lowing equation:
gcii = id∗i usi (1)
where idi is a country i’s net import dependence and usi the share of its gas
imports supplied by non-European Economic Area countries. The thresholds
for calibrating the base variable build on the upper bounds of Jewell’s
(2011: 26) three categories of net import dependence. The threshold for full
inclusion is fixed at 10 per cent, corresponding to the upper bound of ‘low
import dependency’; the 0.5 crossover point is fixed at 30 per cent, corre-
sponding to the lower bound of ‘intermediate import dependency’; the
threshold for full exclusion is fixed at 70 per cent, corresponding to the
lower bound of ‘high import dependency’.
Second, data on GDP per capita, obtained from the Eurostat database
(European Commission 2017), was used as base variable for Economic Devel-
opment (ED). The cut-off point of maximum ambiguity is fixed at 26,900,
which corresponds to the average GDP per capita in the EU. The threshold
for full inclusion is fixed at 50,000, in the significant gap in the raw data
between Denmark (45,783) and Luxembourg (84,500). The threshold for full
exclusion is fixed at 8,000, locating the two cases in our sample that are not
in the high income country-category of the World Bank (Bulgaria and
Romania) fully out of the set.
Third, the base variable for Green Government (GG) is based on the 2010
Chapel Hill expert survey, which estimates party positions on 13 issues in
28 countries, which asked experts to position parties on a scale between 0
(strongly supports environmental protection even at the cost of economic
growth) and 10 (strongly supports economic growth even at the cost of
environmental protection) (Bakker et al. 2015). In line with previous studies
(e.g., Mello 2012: 436–37), party positions (n) are aggregated into an overall
measure of executive orientation by summing up each government party’s
(i) position on the CHES-scale (ch), weighted by its share of the total
number of seats held by the governing parties (s), as specified in the following
equation:
∑n
i=1
sichi
s
(2)
The 0.5 crossover point is fixed at 5, which corresponds to the middle of the
scale of the expert questionnaire. The threshold for full inclusion is fixed at 7,
the threshold for full exclusion at 3.
Fourth, the base variable that was used for calibrating Public Concern (PC)
is the percentage of respondents that would be ‘very concerned’ if a shale gas
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project were to be located in their neighbourhood. The cut-off point of
maximum ambiguity is fixed just above the median, at 45 per cent. The
anchor for full membership is fixed at 55 per cent, just above the value of
France, which has the most concerned public. Cases where less than 25 per
cent of the respondents are very concerned about shale gas are considered
fully out of the set.
Fifth, as base variable for calibrating Multilevel Governance (MG) we use
the cases’ aggregated country score on the Regional Authority Index (RAI)
(Hooghe et al. 2016). Based on the scale of theoretically possible values at
the regional level, which ranges from 0 (lowest level of regional authority)
to 30 (highest level of regional authority), the 0.5 crossover point is fixed at
15.6 This value is situated just below the RAI-score of the Netherlands,
which is generally described as a ‘decentralized unitary state’ (Gupta et al.
2007: 172; Hulst 2005: 100). The threshold for full exclusion is fixed at 10, cor-
responding to the RAI-score of Romania, a state ‘with a strong centralist tra-
dition’ in which ‘only some tentative first steps towards decentralisation
were taken’ (Bochsler and Szöcsik 2013: 431). The threshold for full inclusion
is set to 25. This way, the two states with a long ‘established federal (Germany)
or regionalist (Spain) tradition’ are located fully inside the set (Cole and Lough-
lin 2003: 266).
Sixth, the base variable for the cases’ democratic history builds on the
Democratic Stock (DS) variable (cf. Gerring et al. 2005), which captures both
the differences in degree and in duration of democracy, and the Polity2 vari-
able of the Polity IV dataset (Marshall et al. 2016). The crucial 0.5 threshold is
fixed at 100, in the large gap in the data between Hungary and Portugal. The
threshold for full exclusion is fixed at 0. Given that a score below 0 on the
Polity2 index corresponds to a non-democratic country, cases with a score
below 0 can be considered fully out of the set of democratic tradition. The
threshold for full inclusion is fixed at 360, between France and Spain.
4. Results and discussion
The fsQCA procedure involves several stages, which were carried out with the
QCA package for R, version 1.1-4 (R Development Core Team 2014; Thiem and
Duşa 2013). The assessment of necessity and sufficiency is based on two
descriptive measures that vary between 0 and 1: consistency and coverage
(Ragin 2008: 44–68). Consistency provides a descriptive measure of the
empirical evidence for sufficiency/necessity and approaches unity as the
data provide stronger support. Coverage describes the empirical relevance
of a sufficient or necessary condition and approaches unity as a condition
becomes more relevant.
What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for permissive regu-
lations? The results of the analysis of necessity, presented in Section 3 of
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the Online Appendix, reveal that the consistency of one condition exceeds the
recommended 0.9 threshold: the absence of green government (∼GG). Its low
coverage value of 0.57 suggests that it might constitute a trivial necessary
condition.7 The analysis of sufficiency builds on a truth table, which is pre-
sented and discussed in Section 3 of the Online Appendix (Ragin 2008:
124–44). Table 2 presents the solution that results after Boolean minimization
was applied to the truth table.8 This solution shows that two combinations of
conditions consistently lead to permissive regulations. More specifically, we
see that the absence of public concern consistently results in permissive regu-
lations in countries that have a low level of economic development or if both
green government and multilevel governance are absent. The high consist-
ency of 0.829 provides strong evidence that the solution indeed corresponds
to sufficient combinations. The high coverage of 0.791 indicates that the sol-
ution explains a significant share of the outcome’s presence.
Under which conditions did the cases adopt restrictive regulations? The
analysis of necessity, presented in Section 3 of the Online Appendix, reveals
that none of the consistency values of the conditions (or their negation)
exceeds the recommended 0.9 threshold. The truth table is presented and dis-
cussed in Section 3 of the Online Appendix. The minimized solution, pre-
sented in Table 2, shows that a concerned public and a green government
are sufficient conditions for restrictive regulations. Likewise, states with a mul-
tilevel governance system consistently adopt restrictive regulations if they
have a high level of economic development. The consistency of the solution
equals 0.800, providing strong evidence that the different pathways indeed
corresponds to sufficient combinations. Its high coverage of 0.854 indicates
that the solution explains a significant share of the outcome’s absence.
Table 2. Solutions permissive and restrictive regulation.
Consis-
tency
Coverage
Solution Raw Unique Cases
Permissive
regulation
∼PC*∼ED 0.890 0.755 0.132 Spain, Romania, Portugal, Hungary,
Lithuania, Poland
∼PC*∼GG*∼MG 0.811 0.659 0.036 UK, Romania, Portugal, Hungary,
Lithuania, Poland
Total 0.829 0.791
Restrictive
Regulation
GG 0.821 0.339 0.080 Denmark
PC 0.809 0.691 0.315 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Ireland,
Luxembourg, Germany, Austria, France
MG*ED 0.769 0.298 0.081 Netherlands, Germany, Austria, France
Total 0.800 0.852
Notes: [PR] Permissive Regulation; [GG] Green Government; [MG] Multilevel Governance; [PC] Public
Concern, [ED] Economic Development; [∼] indicates the absence of a condition.
In QCA, cases can be covered by multiple paths (Ragin 2008: 63–8). Cases that are uniquely covered by a
path are in regular font, cases that are covered by multiple paths are in italic.
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In summary, the results of the QCA show that there are two sufficient com-
binations for permissive regulation. First, permissive regulations result if the
absence of public concern is combined with low economic development.
Second, permissive regulations result if the absence of public concern is com-
bined with the absence of multilevel governance and the absence of a green
government. Conversely, there are three sufficient combinations for the
absence of the outcome. First, green government leads to restrictive regu-
lations. Second, restrictive regulations result if high economic development
is combined with multilevel governance. Third, restrictive regulations result
if the public is concerned about shale gas exploitation. However, one of the
cases covered by the latter two paths, Austria actually adopted a permissive
regulation.
The case of Austria warrants some further attention: although there was a
high level of public concern and Austria is an economic developed country
with a multilevel governance system, the Austrian government did not
adopt restrictive shale gas regulations. Nevertheless, case-based information
suggests that public opinion did have an impact on Austria’s shale gas regu-
lation. Although the Austrian government did not ban shale gas exploration, it
did subject fracking – even for exploratory and test drilling – to a mandatory
environmental impact assessment following protests in lower Austria (Lang
2014). After this environmental impact assessment was imposed, Austrian
energy company OMV abandoned its plans to produce shale gas. At the
time of writing, no request for the exploration of shale gas in Austria has
been made, suggesting that the obligatory environmental assessment de
facto banned shale gas in Austria.
5. Conclusions
This article makes a two-fold contribution to the extant literature. First, it pro-
vides a broader empirical base of knowledge on how public policies are
designed and chosen in the field of energy policy. We are the first to system-
atically map and code shale gas regulations in 16 EU member states (cf.
Section 2 of the Online Appendix). Second, the article contributes to theory
development in the field of comparative environmental policy by testing six
hypotheses on the regulation of shale gas in Europe. Rather than seeing
the spread of risky technologies such as fracking merely as the product of
material realities (e.g., attributes of the technology or geological conditions)
or as a function of having the ‘right’ regulations in place, this article points
to the complex interplay of public and private interests, ideational factors,
and institutional and political contexts in producing regulation.
Our analysis shows that public opinion is vital to explain regulatory bans on
fracking in Europe. The countries in our sample with strong public concern
have invariably adopted restrictive regulations. Survey research in the US
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has shown that public attitudes to fracking are related to a host of variables,
including socio-demographic factors, environmental attitudes, political ideol-
ogy and affective imagery (Boudet et al. 2014). Public concern might also be
influenced by framing strategies adopted by different political coalitions
(Bomberg 2017; Metze 2017), as well as focusing events (Davis 2012). The
strength and success of protest campaigns and anti-fracking mobilization
might also shape public opinion. These elements, which are exogenous to
our model, might help to explain the remarkable policy swings that some
countries have experienced with regard to shale gas regulation.
It should be noted that a green government and the combination of a mul-
tilevel governance system and advanced economic development also results
in restrictive regulations, irrespective of public opinion. Conversely, the
absence of public concern only leads to permissive regulations if combined
with either the absence of economic development or the absence of both a
multilevel governance system and a green government. In simple terms,
public concern is a key ingredient to explain fracking moratoria, but restrictive
policies can also be adopted in the absence of a concerned public opinion.
Our results also indicate that variance in shale gas regulation can be
explained without reference to certain factors. First, our model did not
include the size of shale reserves as a factor. Shale reserves are estimates at
best, and it is difficult to know the information policy-makers had at their dis-
posal at a certain point in time. Poland’s reserves have been corrected down-
ward significantly over the past few years. Second, the model did include
democratic tradition as one of the hypothesized explanations, but it proved
redundant. The reason probably is that, except for Spain and Portugal,
there is strong correlation between economic development and democratic
tradition (see Table A3.1 of Section 3 of the Online Appendix). Our analysis
shows that economic development better explains variance in regulatory pos-
itions on shale gas, which is in line with previous research findings (e.g., Börzel
2002; Lenschow et al. 2005).
More surprising, perhaps, is that energy insecurity is not a strong predictor
of permissive regulation. Energy security concerns are often cited as a key
motivation for countries to support fracking, particularly Eastern EU
member states that are highly dependent on Russia (e.g., Johnson and
Boersma 2013). One explanation might be that countries with strong extrac-
tive industries (oil, gas and coal), and hence less dependence on imports, will
adopt a minimal regulatory response to fracking because the fossil fuel indus-
try holds a privileged position within the state and can effectively veto propo-
sals that threaten their interests (Davis 2012). This line of reasoning might help
to explain the case of the UK, which has emerged as a big supporter of frack-
ing in spite of low energy security concerns, yet it is less apt to explain the
cases of the Netherlands and Denmark.
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While our method allows for systematic and reproducible research and
parsimonious results, there are certainly limitations involved. One is the
relatively small number of conditions that can be included (compared
with, for example, large-N statistical inference), the difficulty in operationa-
lizing certain variables that may be of interest like ‘protests’, ‘framing’ and
‘social mobilization’ (which can be better captured with methods like
process-tracing), or the sensitivity of the model to the calibration of
conditions.
At the moment, European shale gas prospects are bleak. Except perhaps for
the UK, not much is happening in Europe. Several international majors (e.g.,
Chevron and ExxonMobil) have pulled out of Eastern Europe owing to disap-
pointing geology and low gas prices. Even so, it is clear that the emergence of
fracking and shale gas has opened up a vast array of research questions for
scholars of public policy and governance, which have only recently begun
to be addressed. Since public acceptance emerged as a crucial factor in our
study, future research could further examine the trends and drivers of
public opinion on shale gas, and the conditions under which contested tech-
nologies such as fracking acquire a ‘social licence’.
Notes
1. Next to energy security and economic development, environmental and
health protection are also public interests that figure prominently in debates
about fracking. Yet, we treat these items under the rubric of ‘ideas’ rather
than ‘interests’ because our cases do not vary in environmental risk or
health risks associated with fracking; they vary in the perception of these
risks. The environmental and health concerns are captured by our two hypoth-
eses on ‘ideas’ (cf. infra).
2. Information on this criterion was retrieved from the European Commission’s
questionnaires in 2014 and 2015 on the application of its Recommendation
2014/70/EU on minimum principles for the exploration and production of
hydrocarbons using high-volume hydraulic fracturing. It is not possible to
determine which position these countries would have taken if they would
have had recoverable deposits. In consequence, they cannot be meaning-
fully assigned an outcome value and are, therefore, excluded from the
analysis.
3. Croatia was not included in the 2012 Eurobarometer survey, which examined
the degree of concern over shale gas. In Belgium, shale gas is regulated at the
regional level, for which no public opinion data were available.
4. Carter and Eaton (2016) propose a three-point scale that includes: (1) moratoria;
(2) permits with revised regulations; and (3) permits without revised regulations.
While items 2 and 3 correspond largely to our categories of ‘tolerance’ and
‘support’, we make a distinction between open-ended and temporary bans.
5. The calibration of the conditions was achieved with calibrate function of the
QCA package for R, version 1.1-4.
6. The empirical range of values at the country level can be higher than 30 in
countries with more than one regional tier.
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7. Two additional tests, presented in Section 3 of the Online Appendix, confirm
that relevance of the absence of green government is a trivial necessary
condition.
8. This solution corresponds to the most parsimonious formula, which is the only
solution type that is ‘guaranteed to reflect causation’ (Baumgartner 2015: 854).
The conservative and intermediate solutions, two alternatives to this parsimo-
nious solution, are presented in Section 3 of the Online Appendix.
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